Recently a new system for the secure transmission and efficient storage of medical images interleaved with patient information has been proposed in 2003 by Rajendra Acharya et al. In this paper we analyse the security of this system, showing how to improve it to obtain a truly secure system.
Introduction
Secure access to medical images stored on digital media is of greatest importance. These images may be very large in size and number, and usually contain confidential data. Therefore, two important goals are: 1) to safeguard the confidentiality of the patient's personal data; and 2) to save as much space as possible, to reduce the cost of storage and increase the speed of transmission, but without degrading quality. Today's practical digital transmission channels, such as Internet, and digital storage scenarios, such as hard disks, CD or DVD, are considered to be perfect, with no noise or other interference. Thus, no error control coding techniques are needed.
In [1] , the authors propose a new technique to transmit and store medical images, interleaved with confidential patient information. As a first step to guarantee the security of the patient information, this is encrypted using an algorithm developed by the authors. Next, the encrypted information is interleaved with the medical image. The watermarking process consists of swapping each ASCII code in the encrypted text file with the least significant bit (LSB) of the grey scale bit by bit. Eight bits of the text file (thus one ASCII character) replace LSBs of eight consecutive pixels of the image. The interleaved image is thus transmitted over noisy channels and stored.
In the next section we show that the encryption procedure followed in [1] does not correctly work in practice and is extremely easy to break, and we suggest a way to encrypt the patient information via standard encryption algorithms to obtain a more secure system.
Analysis of the encryption algorithm
The encryption algorithm proposed in [1] can be mathematically expressed as:
where T e is the encrypted text and T 0 is the ASCII code of the original text (or graphics file). T e is stored as an integer, which requires rounding it off to the nearest integer. Note that when , which cannot be stored as a normal integer. This means that Eq. (1) cannot be used to encrypt black pixels in the images. The decrypted text is obtained by 
Note that the formula given in [1] was wrong and has been corrected in Eq. (2) . Although in [1] it is hinted that real values might be rounded off to the nearest integer to calculate T e , and T 0 back from T e , we have floored real values when encrypting and ceiled real values when decrypting. Otherwise, it was impossible to obtain the same results as shown in Table 2 160  162  164  166  168  170  171  173  175  177  178  180  182  183  4  185 186  188  189  191  192  194  195  196  198  199  201  202  203  204  206  5  207 208  209  211  212  213  214  215  217  218  219  220  221  222  223  224  6  225 226  227  228  229  230  231  232  233  234  235  236  237  238  239  240  7  241 From a practical point of view, this algorithm cannot work because we have found that, as a consequence of the compressing nature of the logarithmic function, Eqs. (1) and (2) do not yield exact reconstruction: there are many ASCII values for which the corresponding ciphertext is the same, thus preventing the correct decryption of the given encrypted value. In Table 1 all ASCII values and their corresponding encrypted values are shown. As can be observed in Table 1 , there are 61 repetitions, rendering the system useless. For instance, the values 113 ("q") and 114 ("r"), 71 and 72 in hexadecimal respectively, are both encrypted as 242 ("‗") and when decrypting both will be deciphered as 113 ("q"). All these reasons make the system impractical because it cannot work correctly. This table was generated using the following C source code:
for ( i=0; i<256; i++ ) printf( "%c %c %c\n", i, ciphertext[i]=floor(100.0*log((double)(2.0*i))-300.0), ceil(0.5*exp(0.01*ciphertext[i]+3))); From a security point of view, even if it had worked in practice, this would have been a very weak encryption algorithm for two reasons. First, there is no secret key. Therefore, it is not a true encryption scheme, but an encoding scheme. Anyone who knows its operation method can easily recover the original text. Second, even if the operation method is unknown to an attacker or even if a secret key is introduced, the algorithm is a simple substitution cipher, which means that the same plain-character will always be encrypted into the same ciphercharacter under the same key. For instance, in Fig. 2(a) of [1] , the text "Name of the" appears twice. In Fig. 2(b) of [1] it is observed that it results in the same encrypted text. Given the highly formatted nature of the information to be protected due to standard headers in file formats, etc., it would be a trivial task to decrypt such a cryptogram even with no knowledge of the key. As a conclusion, this encryption method offers no protection at all.
If the security of the information being protected is to be improved, it should be advisable to use any of the standard encryption algorithms widely accepted today in all sorts of secure applications, such as Triple-DES [2] , AES [3] , or many others [4] . All of these algorithms use a secret key of variable length (usually ranging from 128 to 256 bits), which makes unfeasible a brute force attack to try all possible combinations of the secret key. They are very fast and easy to implement in any application, due to the large amount of software libraries and packages that give support for them. Just as way of example, in Fig. 1 a sample medical image encrypted using the library implementation of AES running in CBC mode found in Microsoft Visual Studio .NET 2003 Professional Edition is shown. As can be observed, no information is revealed to the attacker. The level of protection achieved using this encryption algorithm is considered to be 100% secure by the cryptographic community considering current state of the art. Furthermore, these encryption algorithms are extremely fast, achieving encryption speeds of 488 Mb/s in a 2.1 GHz processor [5] .
Both the original and encrypted images have dimensions of 512 x 512 pixels with 256 grey levels, consuming a total memory size of 512*512*8 = 2097152 bits = 256 KB. The encryption operation here described transforms one image into another of exactly the same size, thus the encrypted image has also 256 KB. There is no size change due to the encryption algorithm. In fact, any graphic format of the user's choice can be used for the images (original or encrypted). Fig. 2(a) and its encrypted version using the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with a 128-bit key, obtaining a result considered unbreakable in the long term.
Conclusions
In its present form, the system proposed in [1] lacks security and cannot be used in practice. We have pinpointed the security defects of [1] and suggested a very simple way of encrypting medical images resorting to publicly available standard algorithms so that the final scheme is truly secure.
